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Reallocation of Death Taxes
Between the Federal and
State Governments
A long-standing controversy over federal-state allocation
of death tax revenues has quickened with the recent re-
port of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations. In the view of the Advisory Commission, we
ought to expand the present system of credits against the
federal estate tax for death taxes paid to the states. The
authors of this Article reject the Advisory Commission's
approach, primarily on the grounds that it would com-
pound the inefficiencies inherent in a dual system of tax
collection and would accentuate the differences in death
tax yield that presently obtain between the high- and low-
income states. Instead, the authors urge cosideration of
an allotment of a portion of the proceeds of the federal
death tax to the states, with any state's share being re-
duced by its own death tax collections; thus, the states
would be encouraged to abandon their separate death taxes
in favor of a single death tax administered by the federal
government.
Ralph H. Dwan * and
Earl A. Ruth **
INTRODUCTION
The problem of allocating death tax revenues between the fed-
eral government and the states has from time to time received ac-
five attention over a period of many years. The Revenue Act of
*Member of the District of Columbia and Minnesota Bai. Formerly
Assistant Chief Counsel, Intemal Revenue Service.
*Member of the District of Columbia Bar. Formerly Chief of the Es-
,tate and Gift Tax Branch, Internal Revenue Service.
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19241 provided a credit against the federal death tax of 25 per
cent thereof for state death taxes paid up to that amount. The
Revenue Act of 19262 increased the maximum percentage to 80
per cent. Since the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1932' the
credit has been much less and now averages about 10 per cent.
Recently the Joint Federal-State Action Committee4 and its suc-
cessor, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,'
have made studies of the problem, especially with the view of in-
creasing state revenues as a partial substitute for the ever increas-
ing grants-in-aid from the federal treasury.
In this discussion we first present a definite proposal which has
evolved from our studies, and then comment on recommenda-
tions of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions set forth in its report of January 1961.6
I. PROPOSAL FOR REDISTRIBUTION OF DEATH TAX
REVENUES BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
AND THE STATES
In searching for an appropriate method for a redistribution of
death tax revenues we have kept in mind, inter alia, the following
objectives and principles:
(1) Simplification of administration.
(2) Economy of administration.
(3) Efficiency of administration.
(4) Reduction of the burdens of taxpayer compliance.
(5) More orderly and less competitive relationships between
federal and state governments and between different state govern-
ments.
(6) More equitable distribution of tax burden among nation's
taxpayers.
(7) Elimination or reduction of conflicts of jurisdiction.
(8) Avoidance of undue coercion.
(9) Substitution of tax proceeds for federal grants-in-aid.
(10) Consideration of a suitable equalization formula.
(11) National viewpoint as distinguished from a mere local
or provincial viewpoint.
1. Ch. 234, § 301(b), 43 Stat. 304 (1924).
2. Ch. 27, § 301(b), 44 Stat. 70 (1926).
3. Ch. 209, § 402(a), 47 Stat. 245 (1932). The present credit provision
is in INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2011.
4. See Report No. 1 of the committee, dated Dec. 5, 1957. The com-
mittee was created by the President and the Conference of Governors.
5. Created by Pub. L. No. 380, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 24, 1959),
5 U.S.C.A. § 2371 (Supp. 1960).
6. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, COM-
MISSION REPORT---COORDINATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL INHERITANCE
ESTATE, AND GIFT TAXEs (1961) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
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It may be noted that among the foregoing objectives are ob-
jectives that Congress prescribed for the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations and stated in Public Law 86-380,
which established that commission, as follows:
It is intended that the Commission... will recommend
methods of coordinating and simplifying tax laws and administrative
practices to achieve a more orderly and less competitive relationship
between the levels of government and to reduce the burden of com-
pliance for taxpayers. 7
Our proposal is to allot to the states a portion of the proceeds
of the federal death tax collected during each preceding year. If
deemed appropriate, each allotment could be conditioned on the
performance by the state of specifically prescribed functions. The
proposal contemplates a very substantial portion of the federal
death tax proceeds to be alloted to the states, such as 50 per cent.
However, from each state's annual allotment would be subtracted
the total amount of any death taxes collected under its laws for
the preceding year. It is expected that under this arrangement,
Nevada (now the only state which has no death tax) would be
joined by other states in relieving themselves of the burden of death
tax administration.
It is believed that this proposal would eliminate--or at least
greafly reduce-the multiplicity of death taxes among the states
and would concentrate the death tax administration in the federal
government. By its very nature, this is a tax which can be much
better administered by a single, well-trained organization. It nec-
essarily involves many complicated property arrangements that
result in difficult and complex tax problems. However, the total
number of decedents having taxable estates each year is small in
comparison with the great number of cases requiring annual pro-
cessing under other types of taxes (such as the income tax). A
comparatively small group of highly trained death tax examiners
can handle this tax very efficiently. Scattering the administration
of this tax among a multiplicity of organizations and among
many persons spreads out too thinly the processing of a compara-
tively small number of cases for efficient results. If one organiza-
tion administers the tax on cases drawn from all of the states, a
number of specialists can be used for the specialized problems that
arise. This is not intended to imply that the personnel and or-
ganization administering the federal death tax have actually been
superior to those of the individual states. However, it is reasonable
to conclude that one organization administering the death tax can
7. Section 2(7), 73 Stat. 703-04 (1959), 5 U.S.C.A. § 2372(7) (Supp.
1960).
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be made to achieve a much greater degree of efficiency and econ-
omy than is possible with a multiplicity of organizations.
A single death tax administered by the federal government
would eliminate jurisdictional controversies between states such as
arise over questions of domicile. It would be far superior to any
system of uniform state statutes, even if the states could be per-
suaded to accept a standard death tax statute.
As the gift tax is primarily a supplement to the death tax, they
should be treated alike. Consequently. as a part of the same pro-
gram, a corresponding portion of the federal gift tax proceeds
should be added to the portion of the federal death tax proceeds
for allotment to the states under the same formula and conditions.
The practicability of this proposal is apparent. A few simple
amendments of the estate and gift tax chapters of the Internal
Revenue Code could launch the program. Economy in administra-
tion is obvious. The economy and efficiency of a single adminis-
trative organization was the primary reason for the recommenda-
tion of a somewhat similar tax system urged by a Royal Commis-
sion in Canada and its subsequent adoption in that country. How-
ever, we regard the detailed methods adopted in that country as
inappropriate for the United States.
Probably the idea that first occurs to a person considering a
fair division of taxes between the states and the federal govern-
ment is to allocate exclusive jurisdiction of various kinds of taxes
to each. Where feasible, this is of course a simple solution. Such
exclusive jurisdiction is successful in the case of automobile license
fees imposed by the states and in the case of customs duties im-
posed by the federal government. Although exclusive state ju-
risdiction of death taxes has been frequently advocated, we believe
it is not feasible. If the federal government eliminated itself from
this field of taxation, it would dry up as a source of substantial
revenue. History shows that if the federal government were to
abandon this tax, the states would compete with each other in at-
tracting wealthy residents by lowering or eliminating death taxes.
States can afford to do so because the death tax is not one of their
principal sources of revenue. For substantially the same reason,
inter alia, we do not favor the proposition that, for the purpose of
death taxes, estates of less than a prescribed value (such as $500,-
000) be exclusively allocated to the states, and that estates of such
value or more be exclusively allocated to the federal government.
Abandonment by the federal government of estates below $500,-
000 would result in an unwholesome competition among the states
for wealthy residents owning property up to that amount. This
would result in an unnecessary loss of revenue for both the states
and the federal government. Although exclusive state jurisdiction of
DEATH TAX REALLOCATION
death taxes is not practicable, exclusive federal jurisdiction of this
source of revenue is feasible. Furthermore, we believe that this
tax is well suited for both the single federal administration and
the sharing of the proceeds between the federal government and
the states.
The term "allotment" as used herein is to be distinguished from
"grant-in-aid." The term "grant-in-aid" generally connotes a gratu-
ity and would usually be so characterized when it comes from
the general funds of the federal government. If, however, an
amount alloted is strictly limited to the proceeds of a particular
federal tax and constitutes in substantial part or in whole a return
to the state of tax collected in that state, it is not a mere gratuity
from the federal government. In this connection, it is interesting
to note that Professor Edwin R. A. Seligman, as long ago as 1916,
made a similar distinction-between "division of the yield" (al-
lotments) and a "system of subventions" (grants-in-aid).s And
a decade later, in his treatise, he discussed a "comprehensive fed-
eral death tax" with a "division of yield between the nation and
the state."'
Each state's allotment of the federal death tax might be a pre-
scribed percentage of the proceeds collected during the preceding
year in that state, or it might be computed according to an
equalization formula based on relative economic needs. Programs
for which the federal government makes grants-in-aid generally
require greater expenditures in the states of low per capita income
than in the states of high per capita income. Since the purpose
of channeling to the states a much greater proportion of the total
death taxes collected in the country is to reduce the need for
federal grants-in-aid or future increases of federal grants-in-aid, it
is our view that an equalization formula should be adopted for
the computation of the allotments. The equalization formula which
we suggest is to compute each state's share on its percentage of the
national population, adjusted in accordance with the inverse ratio
between its per capita income and the national per capita income.
Another equalization formula, less helpful to the states of low per
capita income, would be one based solely on population, without
adjustment for differences in per capita income. If the use of an
equalization formula were deemed inadvisable and merely a uni-
formly prescribed percentage of the tax collected in each state
were allotted to it, the chief objective of the plan could still be
achieved-that is, the elimination (or at least reduction) of the
multiplicity of state statutes and administrations, with resulting
8. Seligman, The Relations of Federal, State and Local Reventes, Col-
umbia University Quarterly, March 1916, p. 127.
9. SELIGMAN, STUPIES n PUBLIC FINANCE 165, 176 (1925).
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economy and efficiency. However, if the aim of increasing the
states' share of death tax proceeds is to reduce the dependence of
the states upon federal grants-in-aid, while approximating the pres-
ent allocation of funds to the low-income states, there is reason
to adjust the percentage of the federal death tax allotted to
the states in accordance with the degree to which a particular plan
serves the interest of the nation as a whole. Therefore, if approxi-
mately 50 per cent of the federal death tax were allotted to the
states under the income-adjusted equalization formula which we
favor, the portion allotted to the states under an equalization for-
mula based solely on population could justifiably be reduced to
40-45 per cent; and if no equalization formula were used, the
percentage could be still less-perhaps 35-40 per cent.
It may be anticipated that the principal objection to the proposal
will be an alleged loss of financial independence on the part of
the states. It may be argued that the states would become de-
pendent upon the federal government for their share of death tax
revenue instead of relying on their own independent death tax in
the old American tradition. But the continued existence of the
state death tax revenue is now dependent upon the support of the
federal death tax. As previously pointed out, this source of revenue
would dry up if the federal government abandoned this field. Con-
sequently, no actual loss of financial independence would result
from the adoption of this proposal. It would in fact support state
activity in areas best handled by the states and relieve the federal
government from such functions. The effect of this would be to
strengthen the state governments and not to weaken them.
Furthermore, since the allotments under our proposal would be
in lieu of some of the grants-in-aid now being doled out to the
states, or in lieu of additional grants-in-aid that would otherwise
be doled out in the future, it is impossible to conclude that ac-
ceptance of the allotments would constitute a greater dependence
than acceptance of grants-in-aid (which are gratuities from the
general funds of the federal government).
A further argument against a single death tax to be administered
by the federal government with shares of the proceeds allocated
to the states, as stated in the January 1961 report of the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, is that "it would sep-
arate responsibility for raising revenues from responsibility for ex-
penditures."1 This is a catchy phrase, but it will not stand analy-
sis. It is not generally customary or desirable to have the respons-
ibilities of collecting taxes and of controlling the expenditure of
tax revenue combined in the same official or the same govern-
10. REPORT, supra note 6, at 89.
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mental organization. Thus, in the federal government, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture expends funds from the Treasury Depart-
ment that were collected by the Internal Revenue Service. Al-
though the states are sovereign in some spheres, they are not in-
dependent nations; their expenditures of tax funds collected by
the federal government and made available to the states-whether
as grants-in-aid or as allocations of the federal death tax-must
be made in a responsible manner. If, for example, death tax
proceeds allotted to a state were wasted, with the result that its
services were inefficient and inadequate, it may be presumed that
the replacement of the officials responsible for such waste would
soon be demanded by its citizens. Finally, we are not here consid-
ering gifts by one nation to another, as in the case of foreign aid.
Another argument against this proposal is that difficulties have
arisen under somewhat similar schemes now in effect in other
countries having a federal system of government."1 Some dif-
ficulties may be expected under any system, but if this argument
is intended to imply that the proposal presents greater difficulties
than other systems, the implication has no basis. On the contrary,
the simplicity and efficiency of the proposal indicate that less
difficulties, may be expected. Difficulties that have arisen in the
countries mentioned and also in Australia, where a sharing system
applies to income tax, may be largely attributed to the lack of
adequate and fixed allocation formulae. This is of prime impor-
tance, and we would not advocate the system without the adoption
of an adequate and fixed allocation formula assuring each state a
fair and equitable allocation of the proceeds of the tax.
We may now turn to a special feature of our proposal. It may
be noted that no state would be required to repeal its death tax
in order to receive its allotment of the federal tax collected. If a
state did not repeal its death tax, however, the amount of its allot-
ment would be reduced by the amount collected during the preced-
ing year under its own death tax. Statistical studies made by the
,Treasury Department' disclose that about 10 per cent of the fed-
eral death tax now imposed is allowed as a credit for state death
taxes, but that the total of state death taxes equals about 25 per
cent of the total federal death tax. Thus the states collect about
2 times the amount of the total credit.1 3 The percentages collect-
ed in the states vary greatly, due to differences in the distribution
11. See id. at 22 n.3 (relating to West Germany and Canada), 91 (re-
lating to Canada).
12. See Final Report of the Joint Federal-State Action Committee,
Feb. 1960, app. V, pp. 71-72.
13. Later information indicates more than 2h times and perhaps
more nearly 3 times the total credit. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 49
(table 9)-
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of wealth and to differences among the state statutes with respect
to the types of property interests reached and to the exemptions,
deductions and rates. A study of the application of our proposal on
the basis of 1958 statistics-with an assumed 50 per cent of the
federal estate tax collections allotted to the states, together with the
use of the equalization formula based on population and per capita
income-reveals that four states would not have received as
much as they collected under their own death tax statutes during
that year. All the other states would have received more. Some
would have received forty and fifty times as much. But state
death tax collections fluctuate greatly from year to year, and it
appears probable that-even with a statistical study covering a
much longer period of time, together with the latest census figures
-a definite conclusion could not now be reached with respect to
a few of the states. These few states would probably desire to
continue their own taxes. The others would probably repeal their
death taxes shortly after the system became effective. Of course,
if the federal death tax were substantially strengthened and the
yield thereby materially increased, all the states could be expected
to repeal their death taxes. If the equalization formula based solely
on population were adopted, or if no equalization formula were
used, all states would probably repeal their taxes, even with a
smaller percentage of the total federal death tax allotted to the
states.
II. SUMMARY OF JANUARY 1961 REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS
Although we do not agree with the conclusions reached in the
Advisory Commission's report, we believe that the report is a
valuable contribution to studies in this field, particularly with re-
spect to the statistical material and to the scholarly manner in
which it is presented.
A. INCREASED FEDERAL ESTATE TAX CREDIT
The chief proposal of the Advisory Commission is to increase
substantially the credit against the federal estate tax for death taxes
paid to the states. They would revise section 2011 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 by means of a two-bracket credit, provid-
ing a high credit in the lower tax brackets and a lower credit in
the higher tax brackets. They suggest a credit equal to 80 per cent
of the gross federal tax on the first $250,000 of net estates, and
20 per cent on the balance. An alternative suggested would limit
the 80 per cent credit to the first $150,000, and 20 per cent on
DEATH TAX REALLOCATION
the balance. Based on 1959 statistics, those alternatives would
allow total credits against the total federal gross estate taxes im-
posed in the United States of 47.5 per cent and 40.8 per cent
respectively." The amount of the credit in each estate would, of
course, vary in accordance with the size of the estate; under the
suggested alternatives the credit would range from 80 per cent in
the smaller cases to slightly over 20 per cent in estates above
$10,000,000.
An important condition is attached to the increased credit. It
would not be allowed for death taxes imposed by any state un-
less that state were to .revise its statute, by imposing higher rates
or otherwise, to increase its total death tax collections up to the
aggregate of the new increased credits plus an additional amount
-to correspond to the present excess of its death tax collections
over the present aggregate credits. At the present time, state death
taxation in excess of the amount of the credit is especially pro-
nounced in the smaller estates. Therefore, merely increasing the
state tax up to the amount of the increased credit would reduce
federal tax proceeds without a corresponding increase in state tax
revenue. The special condition which the Advisory Commission
recommends would increase the aggregate state tax collections to
at least equal the aggregate decrease in federal taxes collected in
the state.
Under the suggested credit, aggregating 47.5 per cent of the
total gross federal tax, the states would collect an aggregate amount
of about 55 per cent or more of the total federal and state death
taxes, and the federal government would collect the balance of
about 45 per cent or less. At present these percentages are about
22 per cent and 78 per cent respectively.15
Another condition which the Advisory Commission would at-
tach to the increased credit is a requirement that such credit be
limited to estate taxes imposed by the state, as distinguished from
inheritance taxes. States would be required to repeal inheritance
taxes and substitute estate taxes. This is supposed to be in the in-
terest of uniformity and simplicity.
B. GIFT TAX
The Advisory Commission does not recommend a gift tax credit,
,ut recommends that the credit for death tax "be fixed at a level
someivhat higher than that required for death tax purposes alone,
in recognition of the fact that property distributions during life
14. Id. at 68 (table 13).
15. These estimates are based on information provided by the Commis-
sion. See id. at 48-49, 76.
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reduce death tax revenues, and to enable most States to forego
gift taxes."' 6
C. ALLOTMENT OF FEDERAL DEATH TAX COLLECTIONS TO
STATES
With respect to a single death tax, to be administered by the
federal government and shared with the states, the Advisory Com-
mission-
recommends that when and if a consensus develops among the States
in favor of central collection and State sharing of death taxes, the de-
velopment should be facilitated. Specifically, the States should be af-
forded an option to forego their independently imposed death taxes
with the Federal estate tax credit in return for an allocate share of
Federal collections.17
This seems to be no more than a recognition that such a plan
merits consideration, and that if in the future the states generally
favor such a plan they should be afforded an option to accept a
share of federal collections in lieu of the imposition of their own
taxes under the shelter of the federal credit. As interpreted by
former Secretary of the Treasury, Robert B. Anderson, in a foot-
note to the report, this recommendation "looks to the more distant
future and does not seem essential to the immediate proposals.""8
III. COMMENTS ON PROPOSALS OF ADVISORY
COMMISSION
Under the present federal statute no credit is allowed on taxable
estates of $40,000 or less, and thereafter the proportion of the
credit increases from less than one per cent on estates slightly
above $40,000 to a maximum of nearly 20 per cent on estates
above $20,000,000. This graduated increase serves no purpose
and the reason therefor is historical only. The Advisory Commis-
sion's proposal would reverse the order of increase in two steps,
by allowing the smaller estates the larger credit and by limiting the
larger estates to the smaller credit. Thus, to a limited extent, a
greater portion of the death tax revenues would be redistributed to
the less wealthy states. However, this is the best that can be said
for the proposal. Since, with minor exceptions (chiefly real estate),
the death tax is only available to the state of the decedent's domi-
cile, the states having few wealthy domiciliaries would be benefited
very little by this feature.
The Advisory Commission has rejected a system, such as we
16. Id. at 23.
17. Id. at 22.
18. Ibid.
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have proposed, which would utilize a federal death tax with the
proceeds to be shared between the states and the federal govern-
ment; the Commission merely recognizes such a system as a pos-
sibility for the distant future. Instead the Commission proposes an
expansion of the present system, with a separate tax for each
state under the shelter of the federal credit. Reasons given in the
report for this decision are both illuminating and disappointing.
We approach the quest for improved coordination of State and Na-
tional death taxes with a predilection for existing institutions becausc
the present interrelationship, built around the Federal tax credit, has
squatter's rights derived from 35 years of occupancy.19
Those preoccupied with the effectiveness of the Federal form of gov-
ernment cloak these complaints [of the States' lesser share of death
taxes, and of the complexities involved in the present system] with
greater significance than revenue considerations alone would warrant.
Because the estate tax credit represents the one outstanding effort
to coordinate overlapping Federal and State taxes, they view its suc-
cess or failure as symbolic of the ability of our Federal form of gov-
ernmental organization to adapt itself to changing times. -0
Although the Commission may feel that these are sufficient rea-
sons for its position, we must conclude that a claim to squatter's
rights and a stubborn adherence to an outmoded symbol may be
more appropriately regarded as hindrances to our federal form of
governmental organization in adapting itself to changing times.
In spite of the Commission's conclusions and the decided slant
in its arguments, it should be commended for its sincere effort to
present all sides, as shown by the following two paragraphs:
Political considerations, in turn, are enmeshed in the enduring is-
sues surrounding the role of the States in the Federal system, their
sovereign right to shape their own tax systems and to engage in ex-
perimentation within the wide latitude afforded by the Constitution,
their corollary obligation to assume political responsibility, and to satis-
fy a democratic society's compulsion to keep decision making close to
the people.
Passage of time has enhanced the public's attachment to these
values. But it has also enhanced the difficulties in the path of their
realization, especially in the area here under consideration: the taxa-
tion of property passing from one generation to the next. As the econ-
omy grows more truly national, the accumulation of private property
becomes increasingly more national. The utilization of markets,
raw materials, labor and managerial skills-the sources of private
wealth-recognizes no State lines. A State's jurisdiction to tax an es-
tate turns to a large extent on the domicile of the decedent, a factor
which may bear no relationship to the geographic origin of his wealth
and which can be changed at personal will. The States, at the same
time, claim a proprietary interest in death taxes because they were
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id. at 6.
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first to develop them and because the decedent's privilege to transfer
property to his heirs is controlled by State law.21
One should note the emphasis placed several times in this re-
port on the states' sovereign right to shape their own tax systems
and their corollary obligations of political responsibility. The first
criterion given for evaluating proposals is: "Will it help to strength-
en State government . . .by preserving freedom of tax action for
the States and by affording them full latitude to exercise political
responsibility? 22
Then there is the assertion that among the arguments that may
be mustered in support of exclusive state taxation on property
transfers at death are the following:
a. The States were first to develop this tax area and have a
proprietary interest in it;
b. The transfer of property from the deceased to his heirs is a
privilege controlled by State law and in the absence of an heir the
property reverts to the State .... 23
The fact that state laws govern the transfer of property at death
-whether by will or through intestacy statutes-gives the states
no exclusive or proprietary interest in the death tax. The United
States Supreme Court long ago decided that the death tax is an
excise on the transfer of property by death,24 just as a sales tax
is an excise on the transfer of property by sale. The idea that the
death tax constitutes a devolution of property upon the state as a
forced heir was rejected by the Supreme Court. State laws govern
not only rights in transfers of property by death, but also sales
contracts, wage contracts, rights to interest on bonds-all of which
are subjected to state death taxes, sales taxes, or income taxes.
The states can have no proprietary interests to the exclusion of
the federal government in any of these taxes. It should be obvious
that no proprietary interest can accrue from the claim that any
state was the first to develop this tax area. A death tax was im-
posed by the Egyptians in 700 B.C., and the Romans during the
first century B.C. developed it very highly.2
Exclusive federal taxation of transfers of property at death,
with shares of the proceeds allotted to the states, should be the
goal of any attempt at death tax reform, for reasons which are
largely admitted in the Commission's report26
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 84.
24. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921); Knowlton
v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331
(1874); cf. United States Trust Co. v. Helvering, 307 U.S. 60 (1939).
25. See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 3 (1942).
26. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 84-85.
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(1) State death taxes depend for their existence upon the pro-
tection of the federal government, without which interstate compe-
tition would quickly dissipate the yield of those taxes.
(2) Large estates are generally the product of economic ac-
tivity on a national scale.
(3) State death taxes require multiple tax statutes and ad-
ministrative organizations, and they develop interstate jurisdic-
tional conflicts.
(4) State death taxation is unstable, with wide fluctuations
of yield from year to year.
(5) A multiplicity of tax organizations cannot be as efficient
as one organization for the entire country, and this is especially
true of death tax administration.
In referring to the foregoing reasons, the Commission states:
These considerations tend to tip the balance of the argument in fa-
vor of National rather than State taxation of estates. . . On logi-
cal grounds there is little to justify universal tax overlapping in an
area which produces less than 2 per cent of tax revenues and at the
same time requires very exacting tax administration .... Under pre-
vailing circumstances, however, a coordination arrangement which
gives at least partial recognition to both groups of contenders, the
States and the Federal Government, appears to possess a priority
claim ... if not economy and efficiency. This was the remedy select-
ed when this issue was last confronted in the 1920's. . . .This would
not foreclose a reexamination of the question at some future time
when the States' "appropriate share" of these revenues has been re-
established and some tangible progress in Federal-State fiscal coordi-
nation has succeeded in placing this issue into better perspective.
The illogical character of this decision seems to have troubled
at least two of the members of the Commission, as shown by the
following footnote:
Mr. John Burton adds the following comment in which Governor
Hollings concurs:
"The information presented in this document makes it very clear
that estates and gifts are not a very satisfactory object of State taxa-
tion. States cannot operate in the area effectively without the pro-
tective umbrella of the Federal tax credit and the amount of revenue
involved is too small to justify duplicate tax administration and dupli-
cate compliance burdens on taxpayers. In our search for less tax over-
lapping, less interstate tax competition, and more economical tax ad-
ministration, we may want to give consideration to reserving estate
and gift taxation for the Federal Government and placing at the dis-
posal of States other tax areas they can administer more economical-
ly and efficiently. However, I concur in these recommendations be-
cause in light of the history of this subject, they go about as far as ap-
pears practicable at this time."'28
27. Id. at 85.
28. Id. at 14.
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We believe that the adoption of the greatly expanded credit and
the establishment of the greatly increased state death taxes under
the aegis of the federal government would erect a formidable ob-
stacle in the way of future attempts to achieve the clearly superior
system which we have described and which the Advisory Com-
mission's report really admits is superior. It would further entrench
the unnecessary multiplicity of state death tax administrative or-
ganizations, and strengthen the claims of the states of "proprietary
interests" in this form of taxation. It unduly emphasizes higher
percentage levies by means of higher rates and additional "pick
up" taxes when the real need is to achieve a more equitably dis-
tributed tax burden. Efforts should be made to lower the per-
centage levies and to spread the tax burden on an impartial ba-
sis. Such efforts could be more successfully focused on one tax.
the federal death tax. Impro,ement of the federal tax should not
be embarrassed by a multiplicity of high percentage levies.
The proposal of the Advisory Commission would perpetuate
the numerous state death tax statutes and expand the numerous
state administrative organizations. The inefficiency and economic
waste by reason of such multiplicity of organizations would be con-
tinued and increased. Jurisdictional controversies would be con-
tinued. Nothing would be gained except the transference of tax
funds from the federal government to the states and this at ex-
orbitant cost. Even the political responsibilities of the states, which
the proponents of this proposal say they hold so high, would be
lessened and not enhanced.
The condition for the allowance of the expanded credit which
would perpetuate the excess of the state death taxes above the
amount of the credit points up one of the weaknesses of the ex-
panded credit proposal. In the eagerness of the states to obtain the
maximum advantage of this gimmick, they may be expected to
increase their taxes much beyond what may be intended. Thus tax-
payers throughout the land would suffer greater burdens, not in
the interest of greater equality, but with the present inequities
magnified.
Since states are free to increase their taxes to any extent deemed
desirable, the question may now be asked: Why does the Advisory
Commission propose that the federal government condition its
allowance of the contemplated enlarged credit on the state's in-
creasing its death tax beyond the limit of the new credit to the
extent that its tax now exceeds the present credit? The answer is
that the state officials are reluctant to take the political responsi-
bility of imposing heavier tax burdens in some cases and of de-
priving taxpayers of tax reductions in other cases. By having the
federal government impose the requirement of such state tax in-
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creases, political responsibility for the result would be shifted to the
Congress. Thus, in the Commission's report we find the following
statements:
States would be free, of course, to increase their taxes to parallel
the additions to the Federal tax credit and to capture their revenue
equivalent for their treasuries without increasing aggregate (Federal
and. State) death taxes. This, however, is unlikely to occur to any
significant degree. The initial effect of the higher tax credit would be
a form of Federal tax reduction and States would be under pressure
not to nullify it by State tax adjustments, lest they discourage the in-
migration of well-to-do residents from other States. This likelihood has
been urged upon us by State officials. 29
[I]t is unlikely that the Federal revenue cost of an increased tax
credit would be substantially balanced by a corresponding revenue
gain for the States through voluntary State action. This generalization
has particular validity with respect to those tax credit patterns which
place heavy reliance on the lower tax brackets .. . because legisla-
tors are particularly loath to arouse apprehension about taxing "the
small family nest egg."30
Because the state death tax excess over the present credit is far
more pronounced in the lower brackets, the state legislators are
chiefly fearful of the political reaction of voters interested in the
smaller estates, and on this matter are concerned to a much lesser
degree with interstate competition for wealthy residents.
Where, we may now ask, is the political responsibility of the
states, which state officials and the Commission's report have so
much emphasized in arguing for the retention of state death taxes?
The Commission states:
The efficiency of revenue sharing in distributing financial aid to
States is by the same token its principal weakness. It would separate
responsibility for raising revenues from responsibility for expenditures.
This consideration looms large in our minds because the strength of
State governments will be no greater than the political responsibility
they accept and bear.31
The Advisory Commission's proposal that states be required to
abandon inheritance taxes and substitute estate taxes is also bad.
We believe that the greater simplicity of the estate tax has been
overrated. A graduated tax based on each beneficiary's share is
more equitable. Although the estate taxes designed to pick up the
difference between the maximum credit and the amount of the in-
heritance taxes limit the characteristic effects of the inheritance
taxes, such limited benefits exist in many cases and have full ef-
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id. at 78.
31. Id. at 89.
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fect in the smaller estates. If, in the future, the federal government
undertakes revisions of its death and gift tax statutes in order to
make them more equitable and comprehensive, it may well shift-
in whole or in part-to the inheritance tax. To require the states
to abandon inheritance taxes in favor of estate taxes would im-
pede efforts of the federal government to improve its tax structure.
At this point we may ask: If the states are to be forbidden the
use of the inheritance tax form of taxation, what becomes of "their
sovereign right to shape their own tax systems"?32 And what of
the Advisory Commission's criterion: "Will it help to strengthen
State government . . . by preserving freedom of tax action for the
States and by affording them full latitude to exercise political re-
sponsibility?"3
CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that the Advisory Commission's proposal with
regard to a central collection and revenue sharing plan is so weak.
They propose that it be considered in the distant future "when
and if a consensus develops among the States"'" in favor of it.
Consideration of this plan-or any other plan-should not depend
wholly on the wishes of state governments. The matter of an ef-
ficient and equitable revenue system for the entire country is pri-
marily the concern of the people of the United States and their
representatives in Congress. It should be considered now, or at
any time the people or the Congress deem desirable. It is not a
matter to be taken up only "when and if a consensus develops
among the States."
In order to safeguard the development of equitable improve-
ments of death taxation in this country, we think it is important
that the proposals of the Advisory Commission on Intergovern-
mental Relations, as stated in its January 1961 report, be rejected.
We hope that the proposal set forth in the Part I of this Article
will receive careful and favorable consideration.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Id. at 8.
34. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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